Realism-Instrumentalism Dichotomy

Chakravartty, Anjan, "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):

According to realism, claims about scientific entities, processes, properties, and relations, whether they be observable or unobservable, should be construed literally as having truth values, whether true or false. This semantic commitment contrasts primarily with those of so-called instrumentalist epistemologies of science, which interpret descriptions of unobservables simply as instruments for the prediction of observable phenomena, or for systematizing observation reports. Traditionally, instrumentalism holds that claims about unobservable things have no literal meaning at all (though the term is often used more liberally in connection with some antirealist positions today)

Niiniluoto, Ilkka, "Scientific Progress", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):

The instrumentalists follow Duhem in thinking that theories are merely conceptual tools for classifying, systematizing and predicting observational statements, so that the genuine content of science is not to be found on the level of theories

—Wow, look at that leap from 'merely conceptual tools for…' to genuine content not being found in theories!

Belot, G. (1998). Understanding electromagnetism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4), 531-555:

there is a very straightforward sense in which a false — but eminently useful — theory like electromagnetism can tell us about our world: it makes empirical predictions which are very accurate within a certain circumscribed domain of applicability. But it seems strange to say that the interpretation of such a theory tells us about our world. To interpret a theory is to describe the possible worlds about which it is the literal truth.